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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Bradshaw appeals from the judgment and conviction entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of felony destruction of evidence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Meridian Police Officer Isaiah Wear observed Bradshaw, whom he
confirmed through his mobile data computer to have a suspended license, drive
into a parking lot and exit his vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.205, L.18 - p.208, L.2.) Officer
Wear approached Bradshaw and placed him under arrest. (Trial Tr., p.208, L.13
- p.211, L.8.) Officer Wear then searched Bradshaw's pockets and placed items
he found there on the trunk of Bradshaw's car. (Trial Tr., p.213, L.1 - p.215,
L.6.)
As Officer Wear was about to put Bradshaw into his patrol car, Bradshaw
lunged back and grabbed a "clear, plastic wrapped item with a white, powdery
substance in it" of off the car trunk with his mouth. (Trial Tr., p.215, L.7 - p.216,
L.19; p.289, Ls.2-17.) Officer Wear and another officer who arrived on scene
both observed the plastic wrapped "bindle" to be the type typically used to
transport single doses of cocaine, methamphetamine, or heroin, and the white
powdery substance to resemble cocaine or methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.220,
L.5 - p.221, L.22; p.236, L.17 - p.239, L.8; p.294, L.18 - p.297, L.2.)

The

officers attempted to extricate the bag from Bradshaw's mouth, but Bradshaw
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swallowed it before they could retrieve it. (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.19-20; p.223, LS.515; p.289, L.18 - p.292, L.22.)
Paramedics arrived and examined Bradshaw.
p.224, L.2.)

(Trial Tr., p.223, L.19 -

Meanwhile, Officer Wear searched Bradshaw's vehicle. (Trial Tr.,

p.224, Ls.3-7.) Officer Wear did not find any controlled substances, but his drug
dog indicated the odor of controlled substances on the trunk of the car where the
bindle had just been.

(Trial Tr., p.224, Ls.3-14; p.232, L.20 - p.236, L.6.)

Officers transported Bradshaw to the hospital, where he refused treatment, and
then to jail. (Trial Tr., p.255, L.23 - p.256, L.24.)
The state charged Bradshaw with felony destruction of evidence, resisting
or

obstructing

police

officers,

driving

without

privileges

(3 rd

offense),

misdemeanor failure to provide proof of insurance, and the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement.

(R., pp.21-23, 40-41.)

The state dismissed the

insurance charge after Bradshaw subsequently provided proof of valid insurance.
(See 3/16/12 Tr., p.15, L.11 - p.16, L.3; R., pp.55-56.) After a trial, the jury found
Bradshaw guilty of all the remaining counts, and the court found that Bradshaw
was a persistent violator. (Trial Tr., p.401, L.16 - p.402, L.15; p.422, Ls.15-17.)
The district court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with two years fixed for
felony destruction of evidence, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.1 01-1 04.) The
court imposed concurrent suspended jail time on each of the misdemeanor
charges. (ld.) Bradshaw timely appealed. (R., pp.1 06-1 09.)
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ISSUE
Bradshaw states the issue on appeal as:
Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Bradshaw's
conviction for felony destruction of evidence when the statute is
interpreted using the rule of lenity?
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Bradshaw's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction rests on his assertion that State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607,83 P.3d 781
(Ct. App. 2003), should be overruled. Should this court decline Bradshaw's
invitation to overrule State v. Peteja because he has failed to present any
persuasive justification for doing so?
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ARGUMENT
This Court Should Decline Bradshaw's Invitation To Overrule State v. Peteja
Because Bradshaw Has Failed To Present Any Persuasive Justification For
Doing So
A.

Introduction
Bradshaw contends that the state presented insufficient evidence to

support his conviction for felony destruction of evidence.
Appellant's brief.)

(See generally

Recognizing that the controlling statutory interpretation set

forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607, 83 P.3d
781 (Ct. App. 2003), is contrary to his position on appeal, Bradshaw requests this
Court to overrule Peteja. However, because Bradshaw has failed to present any
persuasive justification for doing so, this Court should decline his invitation.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope." State

v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, _,283 P.3d 107,112 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller,
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121
Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review the appellate
court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State
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v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991). Moreover, the facts,
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding
the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P .2d at 607.

C.

Bradshaw Has Failed To Advance Any Proper Justification For Departing
From Controlling Idaho Court of Appeals Precedent
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of

stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002);
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,77,803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)).
The standards applicable to the construction of criminal statutes are wellestablished:
The object of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
legislative intent. The literal words of the statute provide the best
guide to legislative intent, and therefore, the interpretation of a
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. The plain
meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative
intent is contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd
results.C] This Court gives the words of a statute their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning. Moreover, this Court must consider all
sections of applicable statutes together to determine the intent of
1 More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that it had "never revised
or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or
would produce absurd results when construed as written," and held that it "did
not have the authority to do so." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Medical Center, 151
Idaho 889, 894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 (2011). In Verska, the Idaho
Supreme Court did not disavow any of the other standards applicable to the
construction of criminal statutes discussed in Doe.
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the legislature. If the language of a statute is capable of more than
one reasonable construction it is ambiguous. When a statute is
ambiguous, it must be construed to mean what the legislature
intended it to mean. To determine that intent, we examine not only
the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of
proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its
legislative history.
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009) (citations and
internal quotations omitted).

Additionally, the rule of lenity requires that

ambiguous criminal statutes should be read narrowly and be construed in favor
of the defendant. State v. Jones 151 Idaho 943,947,265 P.3d 1155, 1159 (Ct.
App.2011).
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-2603, the destruction, alteration or concealment of
evidence which the individual knows "is about to be produced, used, or
discovered"

upon

any "trial

proceeding,

inquiry or investigation,"

is a

misdemeanor offense unless the "trial proceeding, inquiry or investigation is
criminal in nature and involves a felony offense," in which case the individual is
guilty of a felony. In Peteja, 139 Idaho at 609-614,83 P.3d at 783-788, the Idaho
Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory element, "involves a felony offense," as
requiring the state to prove that the destroyed evidence would have tended to
demonstrate the commission of a felony.
On appeal, Bradshaw contends that the evidence presented against him
at trial was insufficient to prove that the investigation in his case "involve[d] a
felony offense."

(Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.)

However, Bradshaw does not

contend that the state's evidence against him was insufficient to prove this
element under the interpretation of that element set forth in Peteja.
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(See

Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) Instead, Bradshaw contends that Peteja was wrongly
decided and should be overruled. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.)
Specifically, Bradshaw contends that in deciding Peteja, the Idaho Court
of Appeals erred by considering legislative history and public policy in interpreting
the legislative intent behind the relevant ambiguous element of I.C. § 18-2603,
instead of simply construing the statute in his favor pursuant to the rule of lenity.
(Appellant's

brief,

pp.7-14.)

Under

Bradshaw's

proposed

alternative

interpretation of I.C . § 18-2603, and pursuant to his application of the rule of
lenity, an investigation would "involve a felony offense" only if the destruction of
evidence occurred while a felony investigation was actually in process.
(Appellant's brief, p.13.) However, Bradshaw's argument fails, and Peteja was
not wrongly decided, because the rule of lenity does not preclude the type of
statutory construction of ambiguous criminal statutes utilized in that case.
In State v. Jones, the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed the relationship
between the rule of lenity and the utilization of statutory construction to reveal
legislative intent and interpret ambiguous provisions of statutes:
The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes
should be read narrowly and be construed in favor of the
defendant. However, this rule does not require a court to disregard
the purpose of a statute when it is clear from the context. Though
the language in subsection (2) of section 49-1405 may be
ambiguous when read alone, when examined within context, the
purpose of the statute is clear. Therefore, this Court is not
compelled to construe the statute in Jones's favor where that result
would be contrary to the clear intent of the relevant statute.
Jones, 151 Idaho at 947, 265 P.3d at 1159; see also Barber v. Thomas, 130
S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 (2010) ("[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering
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text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what [the
legislature] intended." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Therefore, the
Idaho Court of Appeals was not precluded from reviewing legislative history and
public policy in interpreting the legislative intent behind I.C. § 18-2603.
Bradshaw's contrary view of the rule of lenity, if adopted, would not only
overrule Peteja, it would cast doubt on all Idaho appellate court opinions which
have engaged in the type of statutory construction of criminal statutes employed
in that case.

Bradshaw has cited no authority that would support such a result.

To the contrary, as recently as April 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court looked
beyond the language of a criminal statute to interpret the legislative intent of an
ambiguous term, and specifically referenced legislative history and public policy
as types of statutory construction that courts must employ when conducting such
analyses.

State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 225 (2013) (interpreting the term

"resistance" in I.C. § 18-6101, the Idaho rape statute) .
. The function and purpose of rule of lenity is not to preclude statutory
construction of ambiguous statutes, but to prevent courts from enlarging the
words of a criminal statute to include conduct not clearly proscribed by the
statute. See In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 267 P. 452 (1928) (recognizing that a
court cannot "enlarge the words [of a criminal statute] to include other conduct of
like, equal, or greater atrocity, simply because it may be within the same mischief
to be remedied, when it is not fairly included in the language of the act" (citations
omitted)); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 437, 614 P.2d 970, 977 (1980) ("A
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criminal statute must give a clear and unmistakable warning as to the acts which
will subject one to criminal punishment, and courts are without power to supply
what the legislature has left vague" (citations omitted)).
The concern expressed by In re Dampier and Thompson is not
implicated in the present case.

The result of the Idaho Court of Appeals'

identification of the clear legislative intent behind the phrase "involves a felony
offense" as it exists in I.C. § 18-2603 did not criminalize any behavior beyond the
scope of the plain language of that statute. In fact, it is Bradshaw who seeks to
utilize the rule of lenity to

narrow the meaning of "involves a felony offense" to

include only those felony investigations that are already in progress at the time a
defendant destroys evidence.
A court is not required to disregard clear legislative intent of an ambiguous
criminal statute's meaning just because that intent is revealed through a
reasoned analysis of legislative history. In Peteja, the Idaho Court of Appeals'
analysis of the relevant element of I.C. § 18-2603 revealed such a clear
legislative intent:
Section 18-2603 originally provided that the destruction of
evidence was punishable only as a misdemeanor. Then, in 1983,
the legislature enacted an amendment to section 18-2603 to
establish the destruction of evidence as a felony offense in certain
cases. The statement of purpose for the 1983 amendment reflects
the legislature's intent to make the classification of the destruction
of evidence offense conform to the classification of the offense for
which the defendant attempted to evade liability by way of that
destruction, just as it had brought into conformity the offense
classification for the crime of witness intimidation under section 182604 and the crime for which the defendant attempted to evade
liability by way of that intimidation. According to that statement of
purpose:
9

This bill amends Idaho Code § 18-2603 to
provide that if a person destroys, conceals, or alters
evidence, the punishment will be appropriate to the
crime. Currently, altering, concealing or destroying
evidence is a misdemeanor. This is so even if the
evidence would have been used for a felony
prosecution. It is the belief of the Attorney General's
Office that if evidence would tend to show a
defendant had committed a felony, that the
destruction of that evidence ought also to be a felony.
Current law encourages a defendant to destroy
evidence in a felony prosecution in order to incur only
a misdemeanor conviction. The statute proposed is
compatible with § 18-2604, Idaho Code, dealing with
preventing a witness from testifying.
The public policy underlying statutes criminalizing the
destruction of evidence is to prevent the obstruction of justice,
whether permanent obstruction by the destruction of evidence or
temporary obstruction by the alteration or concealment of the
evidence, thereby causing the impediment, frustration, or
unnecessary prolongation of a lawful investigation. Prior to the
1983 amendment, an individual destroying evidence of a felony
crime could incur only misdemeanor liability for that destruction.
With its 1983 amendment, the Idaho legislature intended to close
this loophole.
The Attorney General advocated for the passage of the 1983
amendment in no fewer than four House and Senate Judiciary
Committee meetings. The statement of purpose for the amendment
adopted language from the Attorney General's winning argument,
stating that a felony destruction of evidence offense should accrue
"if the evidence would tend to show a defendant had committed a
felony." Although the legislature did not incorporate this "tendency
to show" language into the statute itself, its inclusion of this
language in the statement of purpose clarifies its intent as to the
meaning of the statute's phrase, "involves a felony." It is evident
the legislature did not intend to institute the restrictive limits
postulated by Peteja whereby the classification of the destruction of
evidence offense is fixed forever to the classification of the offense
targeted by the investigation at its inception. Just as the purpose of
a traffic stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated, neither is
the purpose of a police investigation fixed upon its inception. Like a
traffic stop, events continue to unfold during an investigation and,
10

combined with the officer's observations and general inquiries,
often give rise to legitimate reasons for new lines of inquiry and
further investigation by an officer. The statutory construction
advocated by Peteja thus would produce a palpably absurd result.
In addition , such a construction wou ld operate contrary to the
legislature's purpose for the 1983 amendment by continuing to
encourage defendants, by imposing only misdemeanor liability, to
destroy felony evidence in investigations begun as to misdemeanor
crimes.
Instead, we give proper effect to the legislature's intent by
interpreting the statute to mean that whether the investigation
"involves a felony offense" depends upon on whether the evidence
that was destroyed, altered, or concealed would have tended to
demonstrate the commission of a felony.
Peteja, 139 Idaho at 611-612 , 83 P.3d at 785-786 (emphasis added , citations
omitted) .
Thus, not only did the Idaho Court Appeals appropriately reveal the clear
legislative intent of I.C. § 18-2603, it also found that Peteja's contrary
interpretation of that statute, which is similar to that advocated for by Bradshaw in
the present case, was "absurd ." The rule of lenity did not require the Court to
adopt this absurd interpretation. See Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316
(1998) ("The rule of lenity is not invoked by grammatical possibility. It does not
apply if the ambiguous reading relied on is an implausible reading of the
congressional purpose.") (citing United States v. Shabani , 513 U.S. 10, 17
(1994)).
Bradshaw has failed show that Peteja was wrongly decided , or otherwise
advance any proper justification for departing from controlling Idaho Court of
Appeals precedent.

This Court should therefore both decline his invitation to
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overrule Peteja, and affirm Bradshaw's conviction for felony destruction of
evidence.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury's verdict finding Bradshaw guilty of felony destruction of evidence.
DATED this 21th day of May, 2013.
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Deputy Attorney General
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